The I·CONnect-Clough Center 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law Malaysia: The State of Liberal Democracy
Andrew
James Harding
Professor
Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore
Jaclyn
Ling-Chien Neo
Assistant Professor
Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore
Dian
Abdul Hamed Shah
Research Fellow, Centre for Asian Legal
Studies
Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore
Wilson
Tay Tze Vern
PhD Candidate
Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore
I.
Introduction
Malaysia
approaches its 14th General Election, which must be held by 24 August
2018 at the latest. This election will determine whether the ruling BN
coalition returns to power despite the 1MDB corruption scandal that has
attracted worldwide attention,[1]
and recaptures the two-thirds majority in the federal Parliament which will
enable it to amend the Federal Constitution. No party has enjoyed such a
majority since 2008; hence no constitutional amendment has taken place since
then. Against this backdrop, the constituency-redelineation exercise of the
Election Commission of Malaysia (EC), which started in September 2016, has been
particularly contentious. Opposition parties and their supporters have alleged,
claiming extensive gerrymandering, that this redelineation gives further
advantages to the ruling coalition (which the EC strenuously denies), and the
exercise itself has been held up by extensive litigation across the country
stretching throughout 2017.
Legal and
political developments with a religious aspect continued to be particularly
emotive in this country where Islam is constitutionally enshrined as ‘the
religion of the Federation’[2]
but which is also home to a sizeable non-Muslim minority of around 39% of the
population.[3] These developments
continue to test the dividing line between the two legal systems that co-exist
in Malaysia’s pluralist legal sphere – one centred around the regular or
‘civil’ courts and the other around the religious or Syariah courts which exercise jurisdiction over Muslims in
Malaysia. As exemplified by the ‘bin Abdullah’ case discussed further below,
also at issue is the extent to which Islamic religious precepts and
institutions can influence secular administrative bodies wielding governmental
power in Malaysia.
II. Liberal Democracy on the Rise or Decline?
Liberal
democracy could be said to remain in a relatively precarious position in
Malaysia. While opposition politicians, civil society leaders, and the
alternative media have generally been able to continue highlighting scandals
such as that of state investment vehicle 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB),
and to organize public rallies such as the ‘Love Malaysia, End Kleptocracy’
event on 14 October, criminal charges have been pressed against several
prominent opposition leaders that could disqualify them from politics. This
year, a Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted a Decision
expressing concern over the use of criminal investigations and legal action
against 19 opposition parliamentarians in Malaysia.[4]
The abolition of
the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking, passed by Parliament in
December, represents a tentative step forward for the cause of liberal
democracy. Amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 now enable courts to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment plus whipping for that offence in lieu
of the mandatory death penalty if it finds that the accused ‘has assisted an
enforcement agency in disrupting drug trafficking activities within or outside
Malaysia.’[5]
It is encouraging
that the government, in response to public pressure, removed a provision in the
original bill that would have given Malaysia’s Attorney-General, as the Public
Prosecutor, the sole discretion to certify whether or not the accused person
had rendered such assistance to an enforcement agency. In the amendment’s final
version, that discretion now rests with the courts. Thus the reform –
originally modelled on Singapore’s 2013 amendment to its penalty for drug trafficking
– has gone one step further and achieved an even more complete separation of
powers by giving to the judicial branch, rather than the Public Prosecutor, full
control over the decision whether a death sentence should be imposed.[6]
This reform enhances the content and significance of the constitutional
guarantee in Article 5(1) that no person shall be deprived of life or personal
liberty, save in accordance with law.
On the other hand, speech and
activity with religious aspects have come under increasing control and
suppression in Malaysia. Many publications touching upon Islam have been banned
on the basis that they could cause ‘confusion’, ‘anxiety’, ‘anger’, or even
‘division’ among the Muslim community, which the government considers to be
public order concerns.[7]
When faced with challenges to such bans, the courts have tended to adopt a
deferential approach, affirming the government’s decisions.
Furthermore, religious freedom –
especially for Muslims – continues to be highly restricted in Malaysia. In
several cases that came up for consideration in 2017, the courts affirmed
existing doctrine that the question of whether a person was a Muslim or not is
a matter under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. This means that even where a person had publicly
renounced Islam (eg by way of a statutory declaration), they are still bound by
Islamic law, particularly its rules on conversion out of Islam. They can only
convert out of Islam if the Syariah
courts ‘certify’ their conversion, which in the current constitutional context
remains highly unlikely.[8]
These developments could be seen
as lack of due regard for the freedom of speech as well as freedom of religion,
which are enshrined in Articles 10(1) and 11 of the Federal Constitution,
respectively.
III. Major Constitutional Developments
Constituency
Boundaries Litigation
The Malaysian courts continued
to be the main avenue for opposition parties and concerned citizens to mount
challenges against the Election Commission (EC)’s redelineation exercise. The
EC had, in September 2016, published notice of its proposed recommendations for
the redelineation of Federal and State constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia,
as is mandated every eight years or more under Article 113(2) of the Federal
Constitution. These recommendations are thereafter to be reported to the Prime
Minister, who then tables it before the House of Representatives (the lower
house of Parliament) alongside a draft order giving effect to the
recommendations, with or without modifications. Upon the draft order being
approved by not less than one-half of the total members of the House, it is
submitted to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) who makes an Order in terms
of the draft, completing the redelineation. However, at the notice stage, any
State Government or local authority whose area is affected by the
recommendation, or any body of 100 or more persons in an affected constituency,
may object, whereupon the EC shall hold local enquiries in respect of these
constituencies and may modify its recommendations if necessary.
The Selangor State Government –
controlled by political parties in opposition at the federal level – sought
judicial review against the EC recommendations in Selangor, highlighting that
they resulted in malapportioned, gerrymandered constituencies, were based on
incomplete and defective electoral rolls, and lacked particulars necessary for
voters to make meaningful representations in response.[9]
After a prolonged hearing, the High Court declined to intervene on the basis
that the EC’s recommendations and its discretion to take into account the
principles governing redelineation as provided for in the Thirteenth Schedule
of the Federal Constitution were non-justiciable since the final decision on
the redelineation is reserved for Parliament. The State Government nonetheless
secured a stay, pending an appeal, preventing the EC proceeding further with the
redelineation; but the Court of Appeal swiftly overturned that stay. Other court
challenges to various EC recommendations were also mounted, unsuccessfully, by
groups of voters in other states. The deluge of litigation, however, appears to
have significantly delayed the completion of the redelineation exercise which,
under Article 113(2)(iii) of the Federal Constitution, must conclude by
September 2018.
The redelineation exercise is a
serious matter due to the persistent problem of electoral malapportionment and
gerrymandering in Malaysia. Coupled with Malaysia’s first-past-the-post
electoral system, the absence of concrete rules and ratios governing the
apportionment of electors to constituencies in Part I of the Thirteenth
Schedule (which sets out the so-called ‘Principles Relating to the Delimitation
of Constituencies’) has already produced a situation where, in the previous
general election, the ruling coalition polled 47% of the votes in an
essentially two-party contest, yet secured 60% of the parliamentary seats.[10]
The latest redelineation exercise will allegedly exacerbate the problem even
further; to cite but one example, one of the new constituencies it would
produce will contain approximately ten times more electors than another.[11]
There are also serious allegations of ethnic discrimination in the redrawing of
constituency boundaries.[12]
Since the exercise directly affects not only the question of who forms the
government post-election but also whether a government emerges with the
two-thirds majority needed to amend the Federal Constitution, this is a debate
of momentous significance.
Two
Landmark Cases on Separation of Powers
In Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Anor,[13]
the Federal Court re-examined a 1988 constitutional amendment that deleted ‘the
judicial power of the Federation’ from the provision in the Federal
Constitution establishing the courts of first instance [Article 121(1)].
Departing from precedents interpreting this amendment as having drastically
curbed the jurisdiction and powers of the Malaysian courts vis-à-vis Parliament,[14]
the Federal Court stridently affirmed that judicial
power, judicial independence and the separation of powers ‘are as critical as
they are sacrosanct in our constitutional framework.’[15] Therefore,
Article 121(1) was interpreted as continuing to enshrine the separation of
powers and the independence of the judiciary as basic features of the Federal
Constitution.[16]
Judicial power to adjudicate matters brought to court is vested only in the
courts, and ‘any alterations made in the judicial functions would be tantamount
to a grave and deliberate incursion into the judicial sphere.’[17] Thus,
the Federal Court struck down a statutory provision restricting the courts’
ability to determine whether owners of land compulsorily acquired by the
government had been adequately compensated in accordance with the rights to
property protected under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution. This
reassertion of judicial power augurs well for the role of the courts in
safeguarding the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and the rule of law.
Semenyih
Jaya
also revived discussion of the ‘basic structure doctrine’, under which a
legislature cannot amend the written constitution in ways that would destroy
its basic structure, even if the stipulated amendment procedure is followed.
The Federal Court’s explicit assertion that Parliament does not have the power
to amend the Federal Constitution to the effect of undermining the separation
of powers and the independence of the judiciary enshrined therein[18]
is a landmark development that departs significantly from previous rulings on
the issue and brings Malaysia in line with some other Commonwealth jurisdictions.
In
Teng Chang Khim (appealing as Speaker of
Selangor State Legislative Assembly) v Badrul Hisham bin Abdullah & Anor,[19]
the Federal Court clarified the limits of judicial intervention into
legislative proceedings, given the concept of parliamentary privilege. The Speaker’s
act of declaring a member of the State Legislative Assembly’s seat vacant upon
the latter’s prolonged absence without leave – as the Speaker is empowered to
do under the Selangor State Constitution – was held to be ‘inevitably connected
with the essential business of the Legislative Assembly’, such that it was
protected by parliamentary privilege under Article 72(1) of the Federal
Constitution, even though the declaration itself was made at a press conference
and not in formal Assembly proceedings. The Federal Court clarified that the
court could only intervene if the Legislative Assembly, or a committee or
officer thereof, was acting ultra vires
its legal powers. Otherwise, it would be non-justiciable due to parliamentary
privilege.
Religion and Administrative Power
In A Child & Others v Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Others,[20]
the Court of Appeal examined the proper exercise of administrative power in
matters implicating religious identification. In this case, a child was born
out of wedlock under Syariah law to
Muslim parents. When the National Registration Department (NRD) issued the
birth certificate, the child’s name bore the patronymic surname ‘bin Abdullah’
instead of his father’s name. This was done against the wishes of the parents,
who proceeded to make an application to correct the surname to reflect the name
of the father. The NRD rejected the application and justified the decision on
religious grounds, asserting that under Syariah
law – which governs Muslims in Malaysia – an illegitimate Muslim child could
not bear the name of his father, but must be ascribed with the surname ‘bin Abdullah’.
The Director-General of the NRD relied on two fatwas from the National Fatwa
Committee in 1981 and 2003 in preference to the statutory provisions
governing his exercise of power, ie the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957
(BDRA).
The Court of Appeal
judgment, in favour of the appellants, is significant for three reasons. The
first concerns the reach of religious authorities and injunctions in civil or
‘secular’ matters. Unlike the High Court decision that approved the NRD’s
reliance on Islamic law in deciding an illegitimate child’s surname, the Court
of Appeal insisted that this issue is governed only by the BDRA. From this
perspective, the NRD had acted irrationally and exceeded the scope of its
power, as it only needed to consider whether the appellant had met the
statutory registration requirements. The Court stressed that the BDRA does not
sanction the application of Islamic law or principles in the registration
process[21]
and that fatwas are irrelevant to the
exercise of statutory duties under the BDRA.[22]
Second, the Court’s
reasoning has implications for the country’s federal arrangement in matters
involving Islam. National registration is a ‘civil’ matter under the federal
list of powers and any attempt to allow fatwas
– which do not have binding or legislative force in this particular instance –
to dictate the administration of civil law would be unconstitutional. The case
also raises a question about a federal body encroaching on state authority in
Islamic law matters. The fatwas in
question, having been issued by the federal-level National Fatwa Committee, could not have applied to the appellants, who were
residents of the state of Johor. By deciding the way it did, the Court of
Appeal keeps intact the constitutionally-demarcated federal and state division
of powers – powers that have recently been increasingly blurred by fervent
exercises of power by federal-level religious bodies.
Finally, the judgment
displayed great sensitivity to extra-legal considerations, ie, as the Court
aptly expressed, ‘whether an innocent child should be subjected to humiliation,
embarrassment and public scorn for the rest of his life.’[23]
This of course does not dilute the significance of the legal reasoning offered
by the Court, but when considered together with the astute legal analysis,
overall the decision is a welcome approach to deciding important questions
involving religion and constitutional law.
Religion
and Freedom of Expression
One of the most prominent cases this
year was the ban on a book by a Canadian lesbian author titled ‘Allah, Liberty & Love: The Courage to
Reconcile Faith and Freedom’ and its translated Malay version. The stated
ground for the ban was that the book was prejudicial to morality and public
order. Following the ban, the enforcement division of the Selangor state
religious department raided the offices of the publisher of the translated book
and sought to charge the director of the publishing house before the Syariah Court under the Syariah Criminal Offences (Selangor)
Enactment 1995. Under section 16 of the Enactment, a person who publishes or
has in his possession religious publications contrary to Islamic law is liable
on conviction to a fine not exceeding RM3,000 and/or imprisonment not exceeding
two years. The publisher and the director challenged the provision in the
Enactment and the actions of the religious department officers on
constitutional and administrative law grounds. The High Court dismissed the
application on a preliminary objection,[24]
but on appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the dismissal was erroneous and
remitted the matter to the High Court for a substantive hearing of the judicial
review application.[25]
Another case to monitor concerns
the constitutionality of a fatwa by
the Selangor Fatwa Committee against a prominent women’s rights group, Sisters
In Islam, designating the group as ‘deviant’. The group’s challenge was also
initially dismissed by the High Court on the basis that only Syariah courts
have the power to deal with a religious decree. However, the Court of Appeal reversed
the ruling and remitted the case back to the Kuala Lumpur High Court.[26]
This will be another important case as it implicates the scope of a religious fatwa committee’s powers and the extent
to which it is subject to the Federal Constitution’s guarantees of fundamental
liberties, which include the freedom of association and assembly as enshrined
in Article 10.
Child
Conversions and Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976
In
November 2016, a bill was tabled in Parliament to amend the Law Reform (Marriage
and Divorce) Act 1976, which included provisions requiring both parents in a
civil marriage to consent to a minor’s conversion into Islam and providing that
a child will remain in the religion of his/her parents at the time the marriage
was registered.[27]
This offered the best hope for an end to lingering problems brought about, in
part, by civil-Syariah jurisdictional
battles in matters concerning conversions.[28] However, when Parliament
passed the bill in August 2017, section 88A which would have invalidated
unilateral conversions of children, was conspicuously missing. The government
claimed that it withdrew the provision as it would conflict with existing
Federal Court decisions on the unilateral conversion of children.[29]
Even
though the final amendment contained positive developments—for instance, it
cemented the position that disputes relating to custody, maintenance, and
matrimonial assets that arise from the dissolution of a civil marriage must be
resolved in the civil courts rather than the Syariah courts (despite the conversion of one spouse to Islam), as
well as inserting a provision that both the converted and non-converting spouse
could petition for divorce before the civil courts—critics argue that the main
objective behind efforts to amend the law had always been the issue of
unilateral conversion. The fact that section 88A fell through demonstrates how the
government and the political process could cave in to majoritarian pressures
surrounding the question of conversion. The passing of the bill may well have
ended any legislative initiative to resolve the long-standing controversy
surrounding unilateral conversions of underage children.[30] It also raises a crucial
question – if the judicial and political processes do not protect fundamental
rights and minorities, what recourse would citizens then have?
Controversial
Extension of Chief Justice’s Tenure
In July, the Government
announced that Tun Raus Sharif’s term as Chief Justice of the Federal Court
(the highest judicial appointment in Malaysia) would be extended for three years
from 4 August, while Tan Sri Zulkifli Ahmad Makinudin would continue as
President of the Court of Appeal (PCA) for two years from 28 September. Both
senior judges were to have retired on these dates upon reaching the
constitutional age-limit for judges of the Federal Court. This unprecedented
extension of the CJ’s and PCA’s tenure beyond retirement age was purportedly done
under Article 122(1A) of the Federal Constitution, which allows the appointment
of ‘additional judges’ of the Federal Court beyond the age limit. However, it
remains highly questionable whether that provision allows for a judge’s tenure qua CJ and PCA (as opposed to an
ordinary membership of the Federal Court) to be extended in that manner.
Several parties subsequently
attempted to challenge these appointments by way of judicial review. In
November, former Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s application for
judicial review was dismissed by the High Court on the basis that there could
be no statutory duty for the Prime Minister to advise the King to revoke the
allegedly unconstitutional appointments.[31] In December, another
application for judicial review, by opposition party Amanah, was also dismissed
due to lack of locus standi.[32]
The Malaysian Bar took a strong
stand on the matter, convening an Extraordinary General Meeting on 3 August, at
which it resolved that these extensions were ‘unconstitutional, null and void.’[33]
The Bar also resolved that it would ‘no longer have confidence’ in these two
judges continuing to hold office as CJ and PCA, and mandated the Bar Council to
institute legal proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the
extensions. This duly took place and on 19 December, the Bar was granted leave
by the High Court to refer six questions regarding the constitutionality of
these appointments for determination by the Federal Court in 2018. A singular
difficulty arising in this litigation is how the case will be heard and
disposed of, given that the persons who are the subject of the challenge are
currently occupying the top two positions in the very same court hearing the
case.
IV. Looking Ahead to 2018
The main event
in 2018 is undoubtedly the upcoming 14th general election, in which
all seats in the Lower House of the federal Parliament, as well as every state
legislature except Sarawak’s, will be up for election. This election will test whether
the incumbent BN can head off the main opposition ‘Coalition of Hope’ (PH) and
even possibly recapture a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which would enable
it to amend the Federal Constitution at will once again.
If 93-year old
former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad – the one-time strongman of Malaysia
turned government arch-critic – remains at the helm of PH, this election will demonstrate
how far he can sway popular support against scandal-hit incumbent Prime
Minister Najib Razak, particularly among the latter’s core constituency of
Malay and indigenous voters. This election will also determine – at least for
the duration of the next parliament – the ability of the Islamic Party of
Malaysia (PAS) to continue pushing its Islamist agenda for Malaysia since PAS
has chosen to align itself with neither the BN nor PH.[34]
The Malaysian
Bar’s challenge to the constitutionality of the reappointment of the Chief
Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal – presently before the Federal
Court – is a case to watch in 2018. This scenario, unprecedented in Malaysian
constitutional history, will test the ability of the apex court to deliver a
convincing and well-reasoned resolution capable of sustaining current efforts
to rebuild public confidence in the Malaysian judiciary.
Cases on
religious issues, as highlighted above, will also, as ever, be notable in 2018.
Three such cases – the government’s appeal against the A Child & Others decision at the Federal Court, and the substantive
judicial review applications involving Canadian author Irshad Manji and Sisters
in Islam – will be particularly important to watch.
IV. Further Reading
HP Lee, Constitutional
Conflicts In Contemporary Malaysia, (2nd edn, OUP 2017).
Andrew Harding and Dian AH Shah, Law and Society in Malaysia: Pluralism,
Religion and Ethnicity (Routledge 2017).
Andrew Harding, ‘Devolution of Powers in
Sarawak: A Dynamic Process of Redesigning Territorial Governance in a Federal
System’ [2017] 12 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 257.
Gopal Sri Ram, ‘The Dynamics of
Constitutional Interpretation’ [2017] 4 MLJ i.
[1] See Jaclyn LC Neo et al, ‘Malaysia: Developments in Malaysian
Constitutional Law’, in Richard Albert et al (eds), I·CONNECT-Clough Center 2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law (I·CONNECT, 2017) 125-126.
[3] ‘The World
Factbook’ (Central Intelligence Agency, July 2017) <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html>
accessed 8 January 2018.
[4] Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians, ‘Decision
adopted by the Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians at its 152nd
session (Geneva, 23 January to 3 February 2017)’ <http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/comm152/mal21.pdf>
accessed 28 December 2017.
[6] Amnesty
International, ‘Singapore: Executions continue in flawed attempt to tackle drug
crime, despite limited reforms’ (Amnesty
International, 11 October 2017) <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/singapore-executions-continue-in-flawed-attempt-to-tackle-drug-crime/> accessed 4 January 2018.
[7] See eg Mohd Faizal bin Mus v
Minister of Home Affairs [2017] 11 MLJ 397 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur).
[8] Jenny bt Peter @ Nur
Muzdhalifah Abdullah v Director of Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak & Ors and
other appeals [2017] 1 MLJ 340 (Court of Appeal); Mardina Tiara bt Abdullah Emat @ Margaret ak Emat v Director of Jabatan
Agama Islam Sarawak & Ors [2017] 9 MLJ 293 (High Court, Kuching); Syarifah Nooraffyzza Wan Hosen v Director of
Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 995 (High Court,
Kuching)
[9] Kerajaan Negeri Selangor v Suruhanjaya Pilihan
Raya & Others
[2017] MLJU 1902 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur).
[10] ‘What’s
Malay for gerrymandering?’ (The Economist,
9 August 2014) <www.economist.com/news/asia/21611139-years-delineation-electoral-boundaries-will-determine-future-malaysian-politics-whats> accessed 4 January 2018.
[11] ‘Selangor
voters cite massive size discrepancies in objections to EC’s redelineation’ (Malay Mail Online, 3 January 2018) <www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/selangor-voters-cite-massive-size-discrepancies-in-objections-to-ecs-redeli#mcKXzzPe1XfLxgEw.97> accessed 4 January 2018.
[12] ‘EC’s
Redelineation Clearly Biased, Critics Tell PM’s Aide’ (The Malaysian Insight, 19 December 2017) <www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/28456/> accessed 4 January 2018.
[14] See Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan [2008] 1 MLJ 1 (Federal Court); Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v
Kekatong Sdn Bhd [2004] 2 MLJ 257 (Federal Court).
[24] ZI Publications Sdn Bhd &
Anor v Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 1816.
[25] ZI Publications Sdn Bhd &
Anor v Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 997.
[26] Zurairi AR, ‘SIS allowed to continue judicial review against
‘deviant’ fatwa’ (Malay Mail Online,
2 March 2017) <www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/sis-allowed-to-continue-judicial-review-against-deviant-fatwa#il1RD6BiAg4YzWCS.99>
accessed 6 January 2018.
[27] Law Reform (Marriage and
Divorce) (Amendment) Bill 2016, s 88A.
[28] See eg Jaclyn
Neo, ‘Competing Imperatives: Conflicts and Convergences in State and Islam in
Pluralist Malaysia’ [2015] 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1.
[29] In Subashini a/p Rajasingam v
Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and Other Appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147, the Federal
Court held that the conversion of a child by either parent is valid ie it does
not require the consent of both parents. This decision was affirmed in Pathmanathan Krishnan v Indira Gandhi Mutho
and Other Appeals [2016] 1 CLJ 911. See also Dian AH Shah, ‘Religion,
Conversions and Custody: Battles in the Malaysian Appellate Courts’, in Andrew
Harding & Dian AH Shah (eds), Law and
Society in Malaysia: Pluralism, Religion, and Ethnicity (Routledge 2018) 145,
150-152.
[30] See Dian AH Shah, ‘Religion, conversions and custody: battles in
the Malaysian appellate courts’ in Andrew Harding and Dian AH Shah, Law and Society in Malaysia: Pluralism,
Religion, and Ethnicity (Routledge 2018) 145 – 162.
[31] ‘Dr Mahathir Loses Bid to Challenge Appointment of Two Judges’ (New Straits Times, 6 November 2017) <www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/11/299989/dr-mahathir-loses-bid-challenge-appointment-two-judges>
accessed 6 January 2018.
[32] ‘Amanah
fails in judicial review bid against CJ’s appointment’ (Malay Mail Online, 19 December 2017) <www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/amanah-fails-in-judicial-review-bid-against-cjs-appointment#kTUFY0YRc4pV3e9q.97> accessed 5 January 2018.
[33] Resolution
Adopted At The Extraordinary General Meeting of the Malaysian Bar (3 August
2017) <www.malaysianbar.org.my/malaysian_bar_s_resolutions/resolution_adopted_at_the_extraordinary_general_meeting_of_the_malaysian_bar_held_at_kl_and_selangor_chinese_assembly_hall_thursday_3_aug_2017.html> accessed 28 December 2017.
[34] Yang Razali Kassim, ‘Is A New PAS Emerging?’ (Straits Times, 5 May 2017) <www.straitstimes.com/opinion/is-a-new-pas-emerging>
accessed 28 December 2017.
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